Mutual fund holdings data reveal a significant impact of mutual funds on the real investment activities of their portfolio companies. I address the problem of the endogeneity of mutual fund ownership by using the shock to investor flows caused by the 2003 trading scandal, in which twenty five mutual fund families were implicated in illegal trading practices. The scandal caused substantial capital outflows from funds that belonged to implicated families. Following the scandal, firms that were held by funds from implicated families experienced significant changes in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Both the magnitude and the direction of these changes varied according to a type of a distressed fund: corporate investment decreased more in firms held by funds whose ownership in the past was associated with increases in corporate investments, and even increased in firms held by funds whose ownership was historically associated with significant decreases in corporate investment. Consistent with models of governance by the threat of exit, the effects are especially strong for firms with high sensitivity of executive compensation to stock prices, firms with liquid stock, and important holdings. These findings provide evidence on the causal effect of institutional shareholders on the real activity and highlight a link between financial and real sides of firms.
Introduction
Can a large group of small shareholders, such as mutual funds, influence real investments of their portfolio companies? Investments, arguably the most important corporate decisions, are at the epicenter of a potential conflict of interests between management and shareholders.
And since relatively small holding sizes dominate equity holdings in the United States, the ability of disperse shareholders to influence management is vital for our corporate governance system. So far, however, there is no evidence of such influence. The lack of evidence, taken at its face value, may lead to an unsettling conclusion: a massive group of shareholders that holds almost 30% of the shares of an average company, seems to be excluded from steering the real activities of public corporations.
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The dismissal of mutual funds as passive investors may at first appear unsurprising. In many theories, a large block of stock is a prerequisite for shareholder influence, which means that disperse shareholders should not have a real impact (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) .
But a recent literature turns attention to an additional governance tool for shareholders who may sidestep an active governance role. Small investors can influence management by the mere threat of exit, since their exit conveys negative information to the market and depresses the stock price (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009) . Supporting this insight, recent empirical papers documents that dissatisfied institutions indeed "vote with their feet," leaving the firms prior to adverse events (Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007) . This renewed conceptual framework calls for a direct empirical examination of the notion of mutual fund passivity, implicitly made in the literature.
My empirical approach addresses two main challenges in appraising the real impact of shareholders. First, ownership is endogenous. Correlations between mutual fund ownership and corporate investments could be driven by common economic conditions and by the selfselection of mutual funds who may choose firms that follow particular investment patterns.
I address the problem of the endogeneity of the mutual fund ownership by using the shock to 1 In fact, the empirical literature is sceptical about the real impact of institutional investors in general. Institutions as a group are entrusted with roughly 60% of the publicly traded equity in the U.S. Some papers (e.g., Wahal and McConnell, 2000; Bushee, 1998 ) document positive correlation between institutional ownership and R&D, but the causal impact of these shareholders is still an open empirical question.
ownership caused by the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal. In this scandal, 25 large mutual fund families were accused in allowing illegal trading practices, such as market timing and late trading, in some of their funds. The legal charges led to significant capital outflows from the implicated families. Since large outflows lead to a decrease in mutual funds positions, the scandal created a shock well suited to test the theories of shareholder influence.
The second challenge is that there is no unambiguous prediction about the direction of shareholder influence on real investment. Firms could overinvest or underinvest relative to the level of investment that their shareholders perceive to be optimal. Shareholders themselves may disagree about the right course of action.
2 Therefore, even with a plausible source of exogenous variation in ownership, testing for an effect of such variation requires a measure of shareholder or firm heterogeneity. That is, one needs either a measure of overor under-investment, or a measure of shareholders' attitudes towards investment policies.
Otherwise, the average effect may conceal important conflicting effects.
To address this second challenge I estimate a measure of each mutual fund's approach to the capital expenditures of its portfolio companies -a mutual fund's type. This measure is a mutual fund fixed effect from a regression of corporate investments (capital expenditures, number of acquisitions) on time varying firm characteristics, as well as year, firm and mutual fund fixed effects. It captures the individual fund heterogeneity in setting corporate investment policies. I then examine the interaction between the fund type and the effect of the trading scandal, that is, I allow the effect of the scandal to vary by the types of mutual funds that held the firms in my sample. If the scandal hurt a fund's ability to influence management, we would expect investments to move in an opposite direction from the fund's type. That is, firms held by higher types would decrease investments, since part of their investments was due to the particular fund's attitude towards investments. 2 Anecdotally, disagreements among shareholders are common. A recent example involving mutual funds is the proxy fight over the merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. Putnam, a largest institutional investor in HP with 2.5% stake, supported the merger, whereas some others, including Wells Fargo and Banc of America were opposed to the deal. Mutual funds' attitudes towards the deal were widely discussed in the media and had a significant impact on the merger, despite relatively small holding sizes.
3 The triple fixed effect estimation is similar in spirit to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who estimated a similar specification for CEOs and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008) who estimated it for blockholders. The exact methodology used here is different from these papers and follows Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) that allows, among other advantages, estimating models with high-dimensional fixed effects. Theoretically, Importantly, the mutual fund fixed effect alone cannot be interpreted as a causal impact of mutual funds on corporate investments; the exogenous matching assumption that is needed to separately identify firm and mutual fund fixed effects is unlikely to hold in my sample. As a result, the estimated fixed effect will comprise both a selection effect and a causal impact of mutual fund ownership. Interacting the mutual fund type with the shock to ownership, such as the trading scandal, helps teasing out a causal effect, with some caveats that will be examined in detail below.
Consistent with the previous literature, I find that an average effect of the scandal on capital expenditures ("capex") could be considered relatively modest: on average, firms held by funds from implicated families had a decrease of 0.001 in capex and an increase of 0.01 in the number of acquisitions. But the average effect conceals an important heterogeneity across mutual funds in their real impact: firms that were held by mutual funds that historically had a more positive influence on corporate investments experienced bigger decreases in their investments. For example, an increase of 1 standard deviation in capex type would result in an additional decrease of -0.0017 in the capex following the scandal (2.7% of the standard deviation of capex in 2003). For firms held by shareholders of low types (anywhere below the 30th percentile), the shock resulted in an increase in investments. For example, a shift from a mean type to a lowest 10th percentile, would change the effect of the shock from a increase of 2.3% of the standard deviation. Qualitatively similar results are reported for the number of acquisitions.
Next, I test several additional hypotheses in order to gain a better understanding of the source of the results. First, consistent with a prediction of theories of shareholders' impact, I find that the results are especially strong for the subsample of important shareholders. Second, I find that the results are primarily driven by firms where the CEO compensation is sensitive to stock prices, which is predicted by the theories where shareholders use the threat of exit to discipline management. Third, consistent with the theories that predict an extensive literature has studied the origins and the consequences of persistent differences in beliefs, e.g., Kurz (1994a,b) , Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson (2008) .
4 I define importance as larger than average holding size for the period prior to the scandal.
shareholders will have stronger influence when the liquidity of the shares is higher, 5 I find that the above results do not hold for a subsample of firms with illiquid stocks.
The contribution of this paper to the literature on the role of institutional investors is twofold. First, the paper provides causal evidence on the importance of mutual funds for real investments. Second, it provides evidence that the heterogeneity among institutional investors is an important driver of their influence. In addition, the paper provides micro-level evidence on the interaction between financial and real sides of firms. The evidence suggests, short-term fluctuations in the financial markets that affect shareholders participation in the ownership of firms might have real consequences for companies they hold.
Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses
Mutual funds have had a significant presence in the ownership of the U.S. publicly traded companies for quite a long time. However, the empirical literature on mutual funds has mostly ignored their impact on real investment activities of their portfolio companies. 6 The empirical literature that examines institutional investors in general, also has not reached a consensus about the real effects of these shareholders. Recent examples include Bushee (1998), Wahal and McConnell (2000) , Hansen and Hill (1991) A potential disagreement between shareholders and management over corporate investments has received a great deal of attention from theorists. In agency models moral hazard may drive investments away from the optimal level if choosing the optimal level is privately costly for the manger (Holmstrom and Weiss, 1985; Lambert, 1986; Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992) . Other theories suggest that managers may have an incentive to boost short-term 5 E.g., Maug (1998) , Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) . 6 One exception, and perhaps the closest study to this paper, is Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008) , who find significant blockholder fixed effects in determining various corporate policies.
profits at the expense of investments that would maximize a long-term growth. This incentives arise due to managerial reputation concerns (Narayanan, 1985; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) , or managerial obsession with short-term variation in stock prices (Stein, 1988 (Stein, , 1989 .
Since these models study different frictions and mechanisms, there is no unified directional prediction on the deviation of corporate investments from the level that maximizes shareholder value; shareholders could be facing over-and under-investment, depending on the firm.
In addition to the disagreement with management, shareholders themselves may disagree about the optimal course of action for the firm. Kurz (1994a,b) shows that rational agents may disagree about the interpretation of the same data even if they share a common goal (e.g., maximizing firm value).
7 Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2006) show that with uncertainty about the precision of signals, agents' beliefs may not converge. Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson (2008) show that with finite signal space, individual learning may not result in an agreement even when agents start with common priors. Therefore, from the theoretical standpoint, it is not surprising that shareholders may have persistently different opinions on the real policies of the firm.
Reviewing the theoretical literature, it becomes evident that even if mutual funds have an ability to affect real investments of the firms they hold, focusing only on an average effect of their intervention may be misleading. The average effect may appear small simply because mutual funds are pushing real investments upward in some firms and downward in others, or because mutual funds have diverging opinions about the right course of action for the firm. Therefore, one either needs a measure of a firm's deviation from the the level of investments that shareholders want, or a measure of shareholders' attitude towards corporate investments. For the lack of a measure of firms' deviation from value-maximizing investment level in my sample, I use a measure of shareholder heterogeneity.
7 In this theory, the disagreement may persist when the data generating process is non-stationary (or when agents are not certain that it is stationary) since in that case the process is not uniquely identified and agents' beliefs cannot be rejected based on the available data. Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor (2008) apply this theory in a financial setting and demonstrate that an uncertainty about future shareholders' beliefs creates an incentive for a firm to go private, due to the instability of alignment between the beliefs of managers and shareholders about future growth opportunities. and Garmaise (2001) studies the interactions between investors' heterogenous beliefs and security design.
There is a growing empirical evidence supporting the importance of shareholder heterogeneity. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) find systematic heterogeneity in voting among mutual funds -some mutual funds are consistently more lenient towards managerial proposals than others. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008) , find evidence for a persistent heterogeneity between blockholders; in their data, there are significant blockholder fixed effects in different corporate policies. 8 Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) document that independent long-term institutions are more inclined than others to monitor management.
PREDICTION 1 (Mutual fund type): Reflecting the heterogeneity in mutual funds' attitudes on corporate investment policies, capital expenditures are systematically related to individual mutual funds that hold the firms' shares.
How can mutual funds enforce their will on the management of their portfolio companies?
Theories of shareholder influence can be roughly divided into two groups, depending on whether the influence is done by direct and active influence ("voice") or by the threat of exit. Theories of voice usually tie shareholder influence to holding sizes (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; Maug, 1998; Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1994; Kahn and Winton, 1998) . In the theories of exit shareholders can sell their shares causing the stock price to reflect their information (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2009) . Management, whose compensation is tied to prices, would then have an incentive to cater to the interests of shareholders. Both groups of theories -voice and exit -predict that illegal trading charges should inhibit the ability of mutual funds that belonged to implicated families to influence firms' investments. In the theories of voice, this would happen since distressed funds would have to reduce their holdings due to outflows. In the theories of exit, the outflows induced by the scandal would lead to an increase in the probability that shareholders would sell their shares for reasons unrelated to the firms' fundamental characteristics, which would hurt the effectiveness of the threat of exit as a disciplining device. Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) shows that institutional investors act consistent with the theories of exit. Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) find that institutional investors sell their holdings before forced CEO turnover, and the long-term returns are negative following their exit.
Better informed (larger) shareholders exhibit a greater tendency to sell these shares. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) find that shareholders tend to sell their shares before value-reducing mergers.
9 See, e.g., Kahan and Rock (2006) for the description of regulatory environment for mutual funds industry. Fifty percent of the fund's assets are subject to limitation that prevents a fund from holding more than 10% of the firm's assets, and the stock of any single company cannot exceed 5% of the value of the fund. Moreover, if a fund wants to advertise itself as diversified, then 75% of the fund must be subject to this requirement. To the extent that accumulating large blocks that are also significant relative to the fund's size is an important factor for the fund's incentives as a monitor, this regulation makes it harder for funds to be effective monitors.
The models of governance by exit, however, make some additional predictions that can help to identify whether the channel they are describing is indeed the mechanism that drives the results. For their mechanism to work, management has to care about the price of the company's stock. If managerial well-being is not tied to prices, the threat of exit will not have much of an effect. Also, shareholder influence should be weaker for firms with illiquid stock. The intuition behind this prediction in the theories of exit is that higher transaction costs make the threat to exit less credible.
10 Finally, common to all theories of shareholder influence is the prediction that shareholder influence will increase if a particular firm constitutes an important part of a shareholder's portfolio.
PREDICTION 3 (Managerial compensation):
The effects of the scandal on corporate investment will be stronger in firms where managerial compensation is more sensitive to stock prices.
PREDICTION 4 (Liquidity): The effects of the scandal on corporate investment will be stronger in firms with a more liquid stock.
PREDICTION 5 (Holding size): The effect of the scandal on corporate investment will be stronger in firms which constitute an important part of an implicated mutual fund's portfolio.
Mutual Fund Trading Scandal of 2003
The trading scandal started on September 3, 2003, when New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer announced a settlement with certain hedge funds accused of illegal trades with funds that belonged to four mutual fund groups (Bank of America, Janus, Strong, and Bank One). The illegal trading practices included late trading and market timing. Following this announcement, a large-scale regulatory inquiry resulted in litigation in which 25 mutual fund families were implicated in illegal trading practices.
Late trading is an illegal practice which involves trading in the funds' shares after the closing deadline, but at the closing prices. Mutual funds in the United States stop trading at 4pm, and any orders that are submitted at the same day after 4pm have to be executed at the next day's prices. However, some mutual funds allowed traders to trade after 4pm at 4pm prices, sometimes as late as 9pm on the same day.
Market timing is a form of rapid trading which takes advantage of stale prices. Prices of frequently traded securities get updated often enough, but for thinly traded securities long time might pass between trades. This makes mutual funds that hold securities that are not often traded near the 4 pm closing time highly susceptible to stale prices -a problem that is especially pronounced in international funds, small-company stock funds, and high-yield bond funds. To illustrate, consider an international fund that holds securities traded in New York, Tokyo and London. At 4pm New York time, the prices on the London traded securities held by this fund would be 4.5 hours old, and the prices of Tokyo-listed securities would be 15 hours old. When market prices are available, the law instructs mutual funds to price their portfolio at the current value. But if the current prices are stale, the law allows funds to estimate the fair value of the security. In this example, when the management fails to properly adjust the price of the mutual fund a market-timer could easily exploit the stale prices if there is a correlation between the U.S. and Japanese markets.
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The scandal thus provides a natural experiment where an exogenous shock to the liabilities of mutual fund families resulted in changes in their asset side, therefore affecting their ownership patterns. This shock is appealing because it was arguably unrelated to the unobservable factors that drive corporate investments, and it had significant negative short-term consequences for the flows of implicated mutual fund families. Figure I shows monthly flows of funds and cumulative flows for funds from implicated and unimplicated families. Flows Much of holdings data are reported quarterly, although mutual funds are only required to disclose their holdings semiannually. In addition, a small number of funds report late.
Following the literature that studies mutual fund holdings, in order to fill such gaps, I impute the holdings for the missing quarters using the information from the recent quarter. In addition, I exclude a small number of funds for which I could not find the fund family information. Table I presents some descriptive statistics and compares funds implicated and nonimplicated families and the firms they held in 2003. Funds that belonged to implicated families were slightly larger. The mean and the standard deviation of fund types were similar in two groups, and they held a similar firms in terms of observable characteristics.
Results

Estimation of Mutual Fund Types
I estimate the types of mutual funds as a fund fixed effect from the following triple fixed effects regression of corporate investments on time-varying firm characteristics, time effects, firm fixed effects, and mutual fund fixed effects:
12 See, e.g., Marcin Kacperczyk and Zheng (2008) . 13 In addition, I exclude regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial institutions (SIC codes in the 6000 range) and funds that have on average fewer than 10 identified stock positions and have less than US$5 million in assets under management .
where I ijt is an investment policy (capex or acquisitions) in firm i that was held by fund j at quarter t, X ijt is a set of time-varying variables that includes time fixed effects and controls (cashflow, lagged log of total assets, lagged Tobin's Q), θ i is a firm fixed effect, ψ j is a mutual fund fixed effect, and ijt is a regression residual. I use the estimatedψ j as a proxy for the type of a mutual fund j.
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) develop a methodology where firm and fund fixed effects (in their application, worker and firm fixed effects) can be separately estimated if we observe enough movements of funds across firms. They propose a way to identify the effects through the "group connection." To define a connection, start with any firm and include all mutual funds that ever held it. For each of these funds, add all the firms they ever held.
Continue these steps until no new funds or firms are added to the group. In my sample, there is only one such group; all firms and mutual funds families are connected. The number of identifiable fixed effects equals to the number of firms + the number of funds -1.
14 The estimation involves differencing out firm effects, then estimating the fund fixed effects using the least squares dummy variable approach, and then backing out the firm effects. Appendix B provides a more detailed description of the methodology.
This method has some advantages over the least squares dummy variable method usually used in corporate finance literature (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2008 (1), (3)) and the number of acquisitions (rows (2), (4)). The first two rows show the results for the full sample, and the 3d and the 4th row
show the results for the pre-2000 sample (out-of-sample estimates). In a triple-differences regressions (described below), I use the out-of-sample estimate of type in order to mitigate a concern of spurious correlation.
Consistent with the view that there is a significant heterogeneity between mutual funds in their attitude toward corporate investments, I reject the hypothesis that all fund effects are zero in all specifications.
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In order to better understand the origins of this heterogeneity, I examine the correlation of the estimated fixed effects with mutual fund characteristics in Panels B and C of Table II .
Panel B shows the average type for different styles of mutual funds-growth, value, core, and other (the rest). Average capex fixed effect is much higher in growth funds than in value funds and in core funds. Same is true for the average acquisitions fixed effect. Growth funds seem to appreciate investments and high-investment firms more than other types of funds.
Pane C of Table II regresses the estimated type on fund characteristics (style and size).
Again, we see that the fixed effects are positively correlated with growth funds and negatively correlated with core and value. Importantly, it is also evident from the low R 2 of these regressions that there is much more information in the fixed effect than can be captured by simply examining the fund investment styles.
The Effect of the Trading Scandal on Investments
To estimate the effect of mutual fund ownership, estimate the following two equations on a sample between the year 2000 and 2007, inclusive. First, a simple difference-in-differences specification that does not account for mutual fund heterogeneity:
where I ijt is either capex or number of acquisitions made by firm i, that was held by fund j during quarter t. Scandal j is a dummy variable that indicates whether a mutual fund j belonged to an implicated family, Post is a dummy variable indicator of the post-scandal period, X ijt is a vector of time-varying controls that includes year effects, θ i is a firm fixed effect, and ijt is the regression residual. The coefficient of interest here is β 2 , the average effect of the scandal on investments.
Second, I examine the interaction of the shareholder type with the indicator whether a fund belonged to a family implicated in the trading scandal. In particular, I estimate the following triple differences specification:
where T ype j is the type of fund j as defined above.
The coefficients of interest in equation 3 are β 3 and β 2 + β 3 * T ype j . The coefficient β 3 measures how the effect of the scandal varies with the family type. The total effect of the scandal can be computed as β 2 + β 3 * T ype j , whereT ype j is a particular family type.
Intuitively, the regression in equation 3 first compares the level of investment before and after the scandal separately for the treatment group (firms held by implicated families) and the control group, creating a difference for each group. Then the regression takes the difference between these two separate differences. This provides an estimate of the scandal on investment. The interaction with type provides the third difference, allowing the scandal to have a separate effect for firms held by distinct types. This third differencing is a direct test of the main hypothesis of this paper, that is, the hypothesis that firms that happened to have implicated shareholders of higher types experienced bigger drops in investments. (2)) and number of acquisitions (columns (3), (4)). In column (1) and (3) we see the effect of the scandal without allowing for heterogeneity across mutual funds (equation 2).
The average effect of the scandal is a decrease of -0.001 in capex and an increase of 0.01 in the number of acquisitions.
Columns (2) and (4) The analysis of the effect of the scandal on acquisitions also shows economically significant results. A one standard deviation increase in mutual fund type results in a decrease of 3.4% of a standard deviation (6.8% of the mean) in the number of acquisitions. A shift from the average type to the 95th percentile would decrease the number of acquisitions by 4.1% of a standard deviation (8.2% of the mean). And a shift to a type of a 10th percentile from the mean would increase the number of acquisitions by 3.9% of a standard deviation (7.8% of the mean).
According to Table III , mutual fund trading scandal had a significant impact on the real investments. The average effect of the scandal was statistically significant for both capex and acquisitions. It was economically large for acquisitions (an increase of about 3% of a standard deviation) and less so for capex (1% of a standard deviation decrease). The average effect, however, hides an important heterogeneity between mutual funds. While a shock to ownership by high types resulted in a decrease in investments, a shock to low types resulted in an increase. To emphasize, looking at the relatively extreme points of the type distribution we learn that replacing a mutual fund of a lowest 1st percentile of type with a fund of a 99th percentile, the effect of a shock would change from an increase in capex of 5% of a standard deviation to a decrease of a 8.3% of a standard deviation. Table IV shows that mutual fund influence is most pronounced in firms with high WPS.
The sign of the coefficient on the triple interaction term is still negative in a subsample with low WPS, but the coefficient is smaller and not statistically significant. This suggests that governance by small shareholders, such as mutual funds, hinges upon the price impact of their exit; in firms where CEOs care less about share price, mutual funds will have less of an ability to influence firms.
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Table V tests whether mutual funds' influence is stronger in firms with a more liquid stock.
I sort the firms in my sample based on whether they were above median in Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure defined as the yearly average of 1000000 * |Return| (|price| * volume) over all days with non-zero volume, using daily data. Again, the sign of the coefficient on the triple interaction of scandal with mutual fund type is the same in both subsamples, but only in a subsample of firms with liquid stock the results are economically and statistically significant.
21 This result is consistent with the view that shareholders will find it harder to influence firms with illiquid stock, supporting the theories of influence by exit, as well as Maug (1998) . Table VI tests an additional prediction from the theories of shareholder influence, namely that the effect of the scandal will be stronger for firms which represent an important part of a mutual fund's portfolio. I sort companies based on their weight in the fund's portfolio, and classify a firm as important if its weight in the portfolio was larger than the median.
The table shows that although the results remain statistically significant in a subsample of unimportant holdings, they are much more economically significant in a subsample of important holdings.
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19 I thank Alex Edmans for making the WPS data available on his website. 20 The differences between the coefficients in the two subsamples are statistically significant at the 5% level. For expositional clarity, I present the results separately for each subsample. The tests of the differences between subsamples were performed on the pooled regression (untabulated).
21 As in the case of the split by WPS, the differences between the coefficients in the two subsamples are statistically significant at the 5% level. 22 The differences between the coefficients in the two subsamples are statistically significant at the 5% level for capex, and at the 10% level for the number of acquisitions.
Robustness Tests
I perform several robustness tests to verify the validity of my results. The first concern is that facing an adverse shock to flows mutual funds may get rid of firms that do not fit their types, in which case we would see a drop in investments following a scandal because firms would decrease investments regardless of the shock. To some extent this concern is already mitigated in my setting since the regression involves the actual holdings of mutual funds following the scandal. It could be the case, however, that mutual funds significantly decreased these holdings, without dropping them entirely. In other words, this selection concern implies that mutual funds of high (low) identified firms that would decrease (increase) investments following the scandal and selectively decreased their holdings in those firms.
Table VII examines a testable hypothesis that comes from this selection concern. If mutual funds expect certain firms would change investments in a direction opposite to their types, they are more likely to decrease their holdings in these firms prior to the scandal.
Column (1) regresses the dummy variable that gets a value of 1 if a mutual fund decreased its holding in a firm prior to the scandal (between 2000 and 2003) on a quintile of a mutual fund type interacted with a dummy for a decrease in investments (capex, column (1) and acquisitions, column (2)).
23 The selection hypothesis implies that as the fund type increases from the first to the fifth quintile, the coefficient on the interaction term will be positive; funds of higher types are would be expected to decrease their holdings in firms that are about to decrease their investments. The lack of significant positive coefficient on the interaction terms for higher types implies that mutual funds were not decreasing their holdings in firms that shifted investments in a direction opposite to their types after the scandal.
The second concern is that a spurious correlations that could lead to the significant coefficient of the triple interaction coefficient from Equation 3. Although this concern is partially mitigated by the fact that I use out-of-sample estimates of type, due to the large size of my sample, it is still important to directly verify the robustness of my main results.
23 Several different time periods were examined which provided similar results. Second, the paper provides micro-level evidence of a link between the real and the financial sides of firms. I provide a direct test of the hypothesis that exogenous shocks to the liability side of institutional investors alter the effect of these investors on the real activities of their portfolio companies. In particular, I show that the exposure of mutual funds to shocks unrelated to the fundamental characteristics of their portfolio companies affect the funds' ability to participate in the process of managing these firms. This link is especially important given the significance of these shareholders in the ownership of the U.S. firms.
Appendix B: Estimation of Family Types
This appendix provides a short description of the procedure used to estimate shareholder types, following Abowd et al. (1999) . For a more rigorous description, see, e.g., Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) . Rewrite equation 1 as:
where d j it , j ∈ {1, . . . J} are indicator variables: Abowd et al. (1999) estimate all the parameters of a similar type of equation by OLS. In particular, the OLS estimator of ψ is the within estimator:
where
The methodology requires observing movers in every family j for the identification of ψ j .
If only one firm is observed for shareholder j and it is not observed elsewhere, then ψ j is not identified. Moreover, the OLS estimator of ψ requires an exogenous firm-family assignment,
After estimating ψ, we can obtain the OLS estimator of θ : Average CapEx ratio (capital expenditures over lagged PP&E) before and after the 2003 scandal by quintile of mutual fund type. The upper (lower) graph is for funds from implicated (non-implicated) families. Mutual fund is a fixed effect (ψ j ) estimated out of sample by running a three-way fixed effects regression I it = βX it + θ i + ψ j + it .
Figure III:
Robustness: Distribution of T-Statistics from a Placebo Regression (a) Each plot is a distribution of t-statistics from a regression I it = β 1 X it + θ i + β 2 P ost * Scandal + β 3 P ost * Scandal * P laceboT ype j + β 4 P ost * Scandal + β 5 P ost + β 6 P laceboT ype j + β 7 P ost * P laceboT ype j + β 8 Scandal * P laceboT ype j + it , where I it is one of the dependent variables (CapEx over lagged PP&E or Number of Acquisitions) of firm i at time t, X it is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and year fixed effects, θ i is the firm fixed effect, and it is the residual. X it consists of time effects, lagged logarithm of total assets, cashflow, and lagged Tobin's Q. Details on the definition of variables are in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated mutual fund type, obtained in the first step regressions.
(b) PlaceboType is drawn from a normal distribution with a sample moments of a Type estimated in a regression I it = βX it + θ i + ψ j + it , where ψ j is a mutual fund's fixed effect, used as a measure of a fund's type. (b) In Panel A, each raw reports the result from fixed effects panel regressions I it = βX it + θ i + ψ j + it , where I it is one of the dependent variables of firm i at time t, X it is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and year fixed effects, θ i is the firm fixed effect, ψ j is a mutual fund fixed effect, and it is the residual. X it consists of time effects, lagged logarithm of total assets, cashflow, and lagged Tobin's Q. The F-statistic is for joint significance of mutual fund fixed effects. P-values and the number of constraints are reported in parentheses.
(c) Panel B reports the average fixed effect by the style of the mutual fund (Growth, Value, Core, and Other).
(d) Panel C reports the result of the regression of estimated mutual fund fixed effects on the fund's style and size. The regression is weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated fixed effect. (1) and (3) examine the effect of the mutual fund trading scandal on capex and acquisitions. The regression is: I it = β 1 X it + θ i + β 2 P ost * Scandal + β 3 Scandal + β 4 P ost + it , where I it is one of the dependent variables of firm i at time t, X it is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and year fixed effects, θ i is the firm fixed effect, scandal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a family was implicated in the 2003 trading scandal, post is a dummy variable that gets a value of 1 for the quarters including and after the scandal, and it is the residual.
(c) Columns (2) and (4) examine the effect of the scandal for firms held by different types of mutual funds. The regression is: I it = β 1 X it + θ i + β 2 P ost * Scandal + β 3 P ost * Scandal * T ype j + β 4 P ost * Scandal + β 5 P ost + β 6 T ype j + β 7 P ost * T ype j + β 8 Scandal * T ype j + it , where I it is one of the dependent variables of firm i at time t, X it is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and year fixed effects, θ i is the firm fixed effect, scandal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a family was implicated in the 2003/4 trading scandal, post is a dummy variable that gets a value of 1 for the years including and after 2003, and it is the residual. T ype j is a mutual fund family type -fixed effect (ψ j ) estimated out of sample (before the year 2000) by running a three-way fixed effects regression
(1) (2) (3) (b) WPS is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 100 point change in firm value. Low (high) WPS firms are firms with lower than median WPS.
(c) Columns (1) and (2) examine the effect of the scandal on capex for low WPS firms.
, where I it is one of the dependent variables of firm i at time t, X it is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and year fixed effects, θ i is the firm fixed effect, scandal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a family was implicated in the 2003 trading scandal, post is a dummy variable that gets a value of 1 for the quarters including and after the scandal, and it is the residual. Columns (5) and (6) repeat this analysis for the number of acquisitions.
(d) Columns (3) and (4) examine the effect of the scandal for low a firms held by different types of mutual funds. The regression is: 
Columns (7) and (8) repeat this analysis for the number of acquisitions.
(1) (b) WPS is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 100 point change in firm value. Low (high) WPS firms are firms with lower than median WPS.
(c) Columns (1) and (2) examine the effect of the scandal on capex for low WPS firms. I it = β 1 X it + θ i + β 2 P ost * Scandal + β 3 Scandal + β 4 P ost + it , where I it is one of the dependent variables of firm i at time t, X it is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and year fixed effects, θ i is the firm fixed effect, scandal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a family was implicated in the 2003 trading scandal, post is a dummy variable that gets a value of 1 for the quarters including and after the scandal, and it is the residual. Columns (5) and (6) repeat this analysis for the number of acquisitions.
(d) Columns (3) and (4) examine the effect of the scandal for low a firms held by different types of mutual funds. The regression is: I it = β 1 X it + θ i + β 2 P ost * Scandal + β 3 P ost * Scandal * T ype j + β 4 P ost * Scandal + β 5 P ost + β 6 T ype j + β 7 P ost * T ype j + β 8 Scandal * T ype j + it , where I it is one of the dependent variables of firm i at time t, X it is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and year fixed effects, θ i is the firm fixed effect, scandal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a family was implicated in the 2003/4 trading scandal, post is a dummy variable that gets a value of 1 for the years including and after 2003, and
it is the residual. T ype j is a mutual fund family type -fixed effect (ψ j ) estimated out of sample (before the year 2000) by running a three-way fixed effects regression I it = βX it + θ i + ψ j + it . Columns (7) and (8) repeat this analysis for the number of acquisitions.
(1) Each column is a regression of of a dummy variable that gets the value of 1 if a fund decreased its holding in a firm, on a dummy variable that gets the value of 1 for each quintile of the mutual fund type, a dummy that gets a value of 1 if a firm decreased CapEx (column 1) or Acquisitions (column 2) following the scandal, and the interaction between the two.
(b) The Sample is mutual fund-firm matched cross-section in the second quarter of 2003, just prior to the mutual fund trading scandal. Standard errors are clustered on the firm level and details on the definitions of variables are available in Appendix A.
(1) 
